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VOLUME XXXIII MAY 1959 NUMBER 2
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL
SUPREME COURTS t
W. J. WAGNER *
THE primary responsibility of the highest tribunal in every
judicial system is to review judgments and correct errors
of other courts. However, in many countries, supreme courts
exercise, in rare instances, original jurisdiction, being in
those cases courts of first and last instance.
THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, a constitutional provision reads
as follows:
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction.1
t This article is based on a forthcoming book, FEDERAL STATES AND THEIR
JUDICIARY-A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZA-
TION OF COURTS IN FEDERAL STATES, Mouton & Co., Publishers, The Hague,
Holland.
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Thus, while the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is conferred upon it in cases involving federal questions, and
therefore is based on the nature of the problem presented, its original juris-
diction "depends solely on the character of the parties ... " California v.
Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 257-58 (1895).
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The words are couched "in an imperative sense," 2 So
that Congress cannot withhold original jurisdiction, in the
above-mentioned cases, from the Supreme Court. In the early
years of the Union, however, there was doubt as to whether
original jurisdiction of the Court can be extended by Con-
gress. This right of Congress "was maintained by many
jurists, and seems to have been entertained by the learned
judges who decided Todd's case." 3 But in Marbury v.
Madison,4 Chief Justice Marshall denied this congressional
power and held that all jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
not classified as original in the basic law of the country must
be appellate. And fifty years later, Chief Justice Taney could
say that "it has long been the established doctrine, and we
believe now assented to by all who have examined the sub-
ject, that the original jurisdiction of this court is confined
to the cases specified in the constitution, and that congress
cannot enlarge it." 5
The Constitution did not say that original jurisdiction
vested in the Supreme Court should be exclusive; and, al-
though some passages of the opinion in Marbury v. Madison
could be understood as implying it was exclusive, 6 it was
early settled that Congress can make it concurrent with that
of other courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 7 provided, in
section 13, that while in some instances the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court shall be exclusive, it will not be
such in some others. The validity of the section was chal-
lenged, five years later, in United States v. Ravara,8 but sus-
tained by a divided circuit court. A similar result was
reached in subsequent cases, decided either by lower courts
or the Supreme Court.9
2 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332 (1816).
3 Note by Chief Justice Taney, following the opinion of United States v.
Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 53 (1851). United States v. Todd was an
unreported decision of the Court of 1794.
4 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5 Note by Chief Justice Taney, supra note 3, at 53.
6 Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 467 (1884) ; Gittings v.
Crawford, 10 Fed. Cas. 447, 448 (No. 5465) (C.C.D. Md. 1838).
I Stat. 73 (1789).
8 United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
1 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); B6rs v. Preston,
II U.S. 252 (1884) ; Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884).
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By virtue of the Judicial Code of 1948,'0 original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court lies in:
(1) All controversies between two or more States;
(2) All actions or proceedings against ambassadors or other public
ministers of foreign states or their domestics or domestic ser-
vants, not inconsistent with the law of nations."1
Without any doubt, to adjudicate disputes between the
members of the Union is the most important function of the
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. In general,
"the importance of that jurisdiction ... has become less and
less," in spite of the fact that in the Constitutional Conven-
tion and in the ratifying conventions more of the little time
devoted to discussions about the Supreme Court was spent
on debates on its original than on its appellate jurisdiction.' 2
This original jurisdiction of the Court was "manifestly in-
tended to be sparingly exercised," 13 and limited to causes
"of a nature rarely to occur.'1, 4 But as applied to interstate
controversies, the power of the Court is of unusual weight.
Hamilton rightfully stated that "the power of determining
causes between two States ... is ... essential to the peace
of the Union . . . , 15 and it is generally understood that by
adopting the Constitution, the states surrendered their sov-
ereign immunity from being sued.1 6 They can be sued by
sister states as well as by the United States; on the'other
hand, the Constitution has not been understood as permitting
the states to sue the Union, unless consent is given.17
10 For statutory enactments prior to 1948, see Wagner, The Original and
Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J.
111, 114-17 (1952).
"128 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1952).
12 Tweed, Provisions of the Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court of
the United States, in THE BACON LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 487, 495 (1953).
13 California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 261 (1895).
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 530 (Modern Library ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
IG THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 517 (Modern Library ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
16 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) ; Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 743-44 (1838) (by implication).
17 See, e.g., North Dakota ex rel. Lemke v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.,
257 U.S. 485, 491 (1922). This rule was rightfully branded as "indefensible."
FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 307 (1935).
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The conferring of mandatory jurisdiction upon the
Supreme Court in controversies between the states was a
marked improvement over the system in the Confederation,
article IX of which provided for the settlement of such dis-
putes by tribunals established ad hoo.18 A suggestion to ac-
cept a similar procedure in the Constitution was rejected by
the Convention. 19 The function of adjudicating controversies
between states gives to the Supreme Court a special char-
acter, and it considers itself "an international, as well as a
domestic tribunal." 20 If the dispute is justiciable, the Court
will deliver a judgment even if the federal law is silent on
the point to be considered. The contention that the Court
has no substantive law to apply was overruled by the Court
in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts.2' The rules of interna-
tional law are frequently resorted to by the Court.
Since the establishment of the Union, scores of important
disputes between the states have been adjudicated by the
Court. The Court exercised this jurisdiction for the first
time in 1799.22 Controversies between the states, decided by
the Court, are of various types, but those involving bound-
aries merit special mention. Jurisdiction over such disputes
was upheld by the Court against the contention that they
were political and not justiciable in nature.23  The question
was definitely settled in the litigation between Rhode Island
and Massachusetts in 1838.24 Suits brought by or against
18 SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLE-MENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 2 (1919); TAYLOR, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (1905).
19 PRESCOTT, DRAiFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 729-30 (1941).
20Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902).
21 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 737, 749 (1838).
For the contention of Austin and Webster, on behalf of Massachusetts, see id.
at 674.
22 New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dali.) 1 (1799).
23 "Another clearly political type of litigation is that of state against state."
JACKsoN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AmERICAN SYSTEi OF GOVERNMENT 72
(1955). Even if this is so, by adopting the Constitution the states submitted
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
24 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra note 23. Jurisdiction obtains even
where the boundary dispute arises out of such a political event as the Civil War
and the establishment of a new state. Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 39 (1870).
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the chief executive of a state acting in his official capacity
are recognized as disputes between states.25
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in interstate contro-
versies is confined to disputes between sister states. Foreign
states cannot be sued without their consent,26 by virtue of a
well settled rule of international law, and there is little
chance that any foreign state will ever consent to be sued
before any court other than an international tribunal. On
the other hand, the states of the Union waived their im-
munity from being sued only as to the sister states, and can-
not be sued, without their consent, by foreign states.27
In contrast with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in controversies between states, which has been exercised in
over one hundred and twenty cases,28 it has never adjudi-
cated a litigation falling in the other group of cases within
its original and exclusive jurisdiction. By express statutory
provisions, the Supreme Court can exercise its jurisdiction
only if the rules of international law permit it. But inter-
national law makes persons enumerated in the statute im-
mune from being sued. Included are all representatives of
the governments of foreign states recognized by the United
States, members of their families and households, and their
servants.29  There is no immunity, however, if the suit is
brought against a person employed by a foreign diplomat if
he "is a citizen or inhabitant of the United States ...and
the process is founded upon a debt contracted before he en-
tered upon such service .... ,, 80 In seemingly the only case
in which this provision was relied upon, an inferior federal
court gave a narrow interpretation to the term "debt" and
dismissed the suit.3 1 But even if a defendant were not en-
titled to immunity, no federal court other than the Supreme
25 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
26 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
27 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
28 Barnes, Suits Between States in the Supreme Court, 7 VAND. L. Rav. 494
(1954).
29 Wagner, The Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court, 2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 111, 120, 123-30 (1952).30 REv. STAT. § 4065 (1875), 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1952).
31 Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, aff'd, 84 U.S. App. D.C. 333 (1949).
It was held that the obligation to support a child was not of the character of
a debt.
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Court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. In
general, immunity is also accorded to diplomats accredited
to nations other than the United States, while in transit on
the American soil.32
The only instance in which the Supreme Court may ex-
ercise its jurisdiction in cases brought against persons en-
titled to immunity is when their privilege not to be sued is
waived. But, as the privilege is accorded not to them per-
sonally but to the nation they represent, immunity may be
waived only by the sending state. 3  In the life of nations,
such waivers are extremely rare.
In all other cases within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, this jurisdiction is not exclusive but concur-
rent with other courts. The following are included:
(1) All actions or proceedings brought by ambassadors or other pub-
lic ministers of foreign states or to which consuls or vice consuls
of foreign states are parties;
(2) All controversies between the United States and a State;
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of an-
other State or against aliens.3 4
In cases in which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is exclusive, the Court must exercise it when requested; 3
otherwise, plaintiff will have no possible redress. This is not
true in cases falling within its original but concurrent juris-
diction. In such situations, the Court has held "that the
exercise of that jurisdiction is not mandatory in every case,"
and that it can refuse to pass upon the controversy "where
there has been no want of another suitable forum to which
the cause may be remitted in the interests of convenience,
efficiency and justice." 31 Whether the jurisdiction of the
32 Wagner, supra note 29, at 130-32.
33 Id. at 122-23.
3'28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1952).
5 However, in disputes between states, the Court will decline to adjudicate
the case if the problem involved is of trivial importance. "[T]he threatened
invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by
clear and convincing evidence." New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309
(1921). In another case, the Court went much further and suggested that it
will not exert its jurisdiction "in the absence of absolute necessity." Alabama
v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934).
36 George v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 464-65 (1945).
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Court is concurrent only with that of lower federal courts
or also those of the states, depends on the provisions of
statutes. Thus, in cases affecting consuls, the federal courts
alone have jurisdiction; 3 7 on the other hand, state courts
also have jurisdiction in suits instituted by the state against
citizens of other states.38
As to the first group of cases within the original and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it should be
observed that unlike foreign ambassadors and other public
ministers, foreign consuls and vice consuls may be sued in
tribunals other than the Supreme Court. The distinction is
understandable, as consuls are not, by well recognized rules
of international law, invested with the representative char-
acter.39 They are, however, agents of foreign governments,
mainly for commercial purposes and protection of the na-
tionals of their countries abroad and, as such, they should
be granted a special treatment, if not by mandatory rules of
the law of nations, then merely by comity among states.40
By virtue of the second provision, the United States may
be sued by the states, if it consents to the suit, in lower courts
as well as in the Supreme Court, and it also may sue the
states in such courts. The former rule of the Judicial Code
that the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction in cases
where the Union sued a state no longer obtains; and, of
course, it could be changed by subsequent statutory enact-
ments making exceptions to that rule. The argument "that
it should be assumed that Congress did not intend to subject
a sovereign state to the inconvenience and loss of dignity in-
volved in a trial in a district court . . .41 was rejected by
the Supreme Court in a case against California, arising out
of a violation, by the state, of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act.
The last group of cases merits a few comments. First,
the party against whom a state brings a suit may not be its
37 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1952).
38 Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898).
39 1 Ors. Arr'y GEN. 41 (1794).
40 It is a privilege "not of the person who happens to fill that office, but of
the State or government he represents." Bbrs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 256
(1884).
41 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1936).
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own citizen; 42 and if a state sues citizens of another state,
but its own citizens should have been joined as defendants,
federal jurisdiction is ousted.43  Discussing the rationale of
the federal jurisdiction in cases between a state and citizens
of another state, the Supreme Court said:
The object of vesting in the courts of the United States jurisdiction
of suits by one State against the citizens of another was to enable
such controversies to be determined by a national tribunal, and thereby
to avoid the partiality, or suspicion of partiality, which might exist if
the plaintiff State were compelled to resort to the courts of the State
of which the defendants were citizens. 44
Obviously, this reasoning does not apply to controversies
in which a state is on one side, and its citizen on the other.
Second, jurisdiction does not lie if a state is the party
defendant. This limitation does not appear from the judi-
ciary article of the Constitution, and it was early held, in
Chisholm v. Georgia ,4 5 that states may be sued, in the Su-
preme Court, by citizens of other states, and that in such
suits judgments may be entered in default of appearance.
Considering the clear terms of the Constitution," it seems
that this result could be expected, although Hamilton did not
understand the constitutional provisions as amounting to a
consent, on the part of the states, to waive their immunity
to be sued by private individuals, and contended that sug-
gestions "that an assignment of the public securities of one
State to the citizens of another, would enable them to prose-
42 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 463 (1945). Section 13
of the first Judiciary Act expressly excluded from the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court cases "between a state and its citizens." 1 Stat. 80
(1789).
43 New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917) ; California v. Southern Pacific
Co., 157 U.S. 229 (1895).
44Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888). A hundred
years earlier, Hamilton had this to say on the topic: "The reasonableness of
the agency of the national courts in cases which the State tribunals cannot be
supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be ajudge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least
interest or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the
federal courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies
between different States and their citizens." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 518
(Modern Library ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
45 1 U.S. (2 Dail.) 419 (1793).
4 6 JACCsoN, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 13 (1941).
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cute that State in the federal courts for the amount of those
securities..." were "without foundation." 11 The Judiciary
Act of 1789 did not seem to prohibit such suits.
The decision in Chisholm v. Georgia was accepted un-
favorably by most states, and the Supreme Court was plainly
defied by Georgia.48  Immediately, suggestions to amend the
Constitution were advanced. They resulted in the adoption
of the eleventh amendment, in 1798, which reads as follows:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any. Foreign State.
The most important class of suits which was eliminated
by the amendment was that in which states were asked to
pay off their debts. The foremost argument advanced to sup-
port the amendment was that any other rule would abolish
the "sovereignty" of the states. After the amendment was
adopted, the Supreme Court held, in Hollingsworth V.
Virgini, 49 that it could not take jurisdiction in any of the
cases similar to Chisholm v. Georgia pending before it.
The amendment was silent on suits brought by indi-
viduals against states of which they are citizens, but in Hans
v. Louisiana 50 the Supreme Court held, invoking the amend-
ment, the views of some "great advocates and defenders of the
Constitution" 51 and "the presumption that no anomalous
and unheard-of proceedings or suits were intended to
be raised up by the Constitution," 52 that such suits are pre-
cluded, as "the obligations of a State rest for their per-
formance upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made
the subjects of judicial cognizance unless the State consents
to be sued, or comes itself into court .... , 5s
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 329 (Modern Library ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
A similar view has been taken by many other outstanding proponents of the
Constitution; WARREN, THE SuPREmE COURT IN UNITED STATEs HISTORY 91
(1947).
48 Warren, op. cit. supra note 47, at 96-101.
49 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 328 (1798).
5o 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
51 Id. at 14.
52 Id. at 18.
53 Id. at 20.
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The eleventh amendment was sought to be by-passed by
making a state the collecting agent for its citizens, so that
the debtor state would be sued not by citizens of another state
but by another state itself. Statutes permitting private in-
dividuals to assign their claims against sister states to their
states and reserving their rights to the recovery after a suc-
cessful suit against the debtor were enacted in New Hamp-
shire and New York. However, the Supreme Court denied
to the plaintiff states the standing to sue, holding that they
were not the real parties in interest, that the eleventh amend-
ment precluded such suits, as it withdrew the special remedy
against the states which was granted by the Constitution,
and that the Supreme Court was "prohibited, both by the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution, from entertaining
these suits . ... ,54
In subsequent cases, the Court held that it would not
entertain a suit between two states where the purpose of the
action was just "a controversy in the vindication of grievances
of particular individuals," 15 and that its jurisdiction could
not be invoked "for the benefit of individuals." 56
Contrary to its suggestions in Marbury v. Madison 51
that if the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is, in specified
cases, original, it cannot be in those cases appellate, the Court
held, in later cases, that it can entertain appeals in cases over
which it has original and concurrent jurisdiction, if in the
first instance the controversy was adjudicated by another
court.
5 8
54New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883). However it was
held by a split Court that if an outright gift of an obligation of a state was
made by a private individual to another state, the latter may bring a suit
against the former. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
55 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900).
56 Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 17 (1939). However, a state has
standing to sue another state as parens patriae with the view of protecting "the
general comfort, health, or property rights of its inhabitants." North Dakota
v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375 (1923).
57 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1801).
5 In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), the Supreme
Court entertained an appeal from a state court in a case in which one of the
parties was a state, and which, therefore, was covered by the constitutional
clause, taken literally, conferring upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over the case. However, the case was a criminal one, instituted by the state:
it could not have been brought in a federal court; and although "where the
words confer only appellate jurisdiction, original jurisdiction is most clearly
[ VOL. 33
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Although the soundness of Marbiury v. Madison, as far
as it suggests the impossibility of broadening the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as set by the Constitution,
may be doubted, 9 it is still good law. Article III of the
Constitution did not expressly authorize the Supreme Court
to issue extraordinary writs; however, such writs were and
are being issued by the Court. The statutory provision on
the point, now in force, reads as follows:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.60
Another provision permits the Supreme Court and any
justice thereof to grant writs of habeas corpus.6 1
Should the power of the Supreme Court to issue extra-
ordinary writs be considered as an exercise of its original
jurisdiction, it would be contrary to the Constitution, unless
the understanding of the basic law as laid down in Marbury
v. Madison is overruled. But the Court continues to recog-
nize that "its statutory authority to issue writs of prohibi-
tion or mandamus to district courts can be constitutionally
exercised only insofar as such writs are in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." 62 And it had the following to say about its
exercise of this power:
Under the statutory provisions, the jurisdiction of this Court to issue
common-law writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction has been consis-
tently sustained. The historic use of writs of prohibition and manda-
mus directed by an appellate to an inferior court has been to exert
not given ... where the words admit of appellate jurisdiction, the power to
take cognisance of the suit originally, does not necessarily negative the power
to decide upon it on appeal, if it may originate in a different court." Id. at
397-98. A few years later, Taney, speaking for a circuit court in a case
brought against a British consul, stated that it was "the established law of the
country" that "the grant of original jurisdiction . . . to the supreme court,
did not exclude from appellate jurisdiction over the same subjects." Gittings
v. Crawford, 10 Fed. Cas. 447, 450 (No. 5465) (C.C.D. Md. 1838). Among
other cases, Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnson, 111 U.S. 449 (1884), where the
Supreme Court entertained an appeal from a federal court in a suit brought
by a state, is well known.
59 2 CROSSXEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATEs 1040-44 (1953).
6028 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1952).
6128 U.S.C. §2241(a) (1952).
62 EX parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943).
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the revisory appellate power over the inferior court. The writs thus
afford an expeditious and effective means of confining the inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction, or of com-
pelling it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. Such
has been the office of the writs when directed by this Court to dis-
trict courts .... In all these cases ... the appellate, not the original,
jurisdiction of this Court was invoked and exercised. 63
Thus, the Supreme Court cannot issue extraordinary
writs to private individuals against acts of administrative
officers; such an exercise of its power would not be connected
with its appellate jurisdiction. But even if it is directed to
a lower court "in aid" of such a jurisdiction, by the issuance
of the writ the Supreme Court does not review a judgment
of the court below, and therefore it is difficult to see how it
can be said that it merely exercises its appellate jurisdic-
tion. 6 4  Down to 1945, cases reaching the Supreme Court on
extraordinary writs were put on the original docket of the
Court."' At present, they are placed on the miscellaneous
docket, as they are "not entitled to be placed on the original
or appellate docket." 06
However, in cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers or consuls, and those in which a state is a party,
the Supreme Court may issue an extraordinary writ even if
it is not "in aid" of its appellate jurisdiction, as the Court
has original jurisdiction in such cases.6 7
The number of cases decided by the Supreme Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction is very small. In six
63 Id. at 582-83. The dissenter, Justice Frankfurter, did not deny the con-
clusions of the majority on this point. He stated: "The issuance of such a
writ is, in effect, an anticipatory review of a case that can in due course come
here directly," and took the view that in the case at bar no writ of prohibition
or of mandamus should be issued, as the Supreme Court "uniformly and without
dissent held that it was without power to issue a writ of mandamus in a case
in which it did not otherwise have appellate jurisdiction." Id. at 591-92 (dis-
senting opinion). In subsequent cases, the Court emphasized the discretionary
nature of the writ. Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs in the Supreme Court since
Ex Parte Peru, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 977 (1951).
64 Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus,
61 HARV. L. REV. 657, 667 (1948).
65 HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTmf 283
(1953).
66 REPORT, DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 151 (1955).
67 E.r parte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552 (1883).
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out of the ten years from 1945 to 1954, no such cases were
filed. One was filed in 1945 and 1951, and two in 1948 and
1952.68
ARGENTINA
In Argentina, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court is delimited by the constitution. While
article 100 of the basic law enumerates cases within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court "and the inferior courts
of the nation," article 101 subjects them to the appellate
jurisdiction of the court, and adds: "But in all cases con-
cerning foreign ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, and in
those to which a province may be a party, the jurisdiction
of the court shall be original and exclusive." 61
The similarity to the United States system is evident;
however, the above provision is not simply copied from its
North American model. The most important difference is
that by virtue of the constitution itself, original jurisdiction
of the court was made exclusive. Besides, by virtue of an-
other constitutional provision, the function of fixing the
boundaries of the provinces belongs to Congress,"0 while in
the United States it lies within the jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court whenever there is a dispute between the states
on that point.
As in the United States, it was held in Argentina that
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be ex-
tended by legislation. In Ex- parte Sojo,71 the first Argentine
case in which a federal statute was invalidated, the Supreme
Court declined to take original jurisdiction in habeas corpus
proceedings, although authorized to do so by an act of Con-
gress. The petitioner was imprisoned by the Chamber of
Deputies for committing a libel against one of the representa-
68 REPORT, supra note 66, at 149.
60 In the Peronist constitution of 1949, the scope of the Supreme Court's
original and exclusive jurisdiction was delimited in broader terms; article 96
vested such jurisdiction in the court "in cases arising between the Nation or a
province or its inhabitants and a foreign State; in cases concerning ambassa-
dors, ministers plenipotentiary or foreign consuls; and in cases between the
Nation and one or more provinces or between the provinces."
70 ARGEN. CoxsT. art. 67, cl. 14.
-132 S.C.N. 120 (1887).
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tives, and obviously the court did not wish to come into a
conflict with the legislature.7 2
Congress permitted suits to be brought before the Su-
preme Court against a province by its residents or residents
of other provinces. This statutory provision was attacked
on the theory that in the United States such suits were pro-
hibited by the eleventh amendment, but was upheld by the
court, in Mendoza Hermanos v. San TAsi 73 and Avegno v.
Buenos Aires. 74
Statutory provisions for the original and exclusive juris-
diction of the Supreme Court are found in the Judiciary Act
of 1950.7r By virtue of its provisions,76 this jurisdiction in-
cludes controversies between the Federation or a province or
its citizens 77 and a foreign state; those concerning foreign
ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary and consuls; between
the Federation and one or more provinces, or between the
provinces. An action brought against a foreign state will
not be acted upon by the court without securing acquiescence
to the suit from the diplomatic representative of the country
involved. A definition of cases concerning ambassadors and
ministers plenipotentiary follows, and suits which affect their
families and the personnel of the embassy or legation having
a diplomatic character are included. A prerequisite for the
institution of an action against any of the above persons is
the obtaining of the permission of the respective government
through diplomatic channels. Cases concerning consuls are
defined as those involving acts or activities executed in the
exercise of their official functions, whether their civil or crim-
inal responsibility is at stake.
77 2 AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75-76 (1943).
73 1 S.C.N. 485 (1865).
74 14 S.C.N. 425 (1874). The court said: "In order that a law duly en-
acted and promulgated should be declared unconstitutional it is essential that
the provisions of the law be absolutely incompatible with the Constitution,"
which was not the case. AMADEO, op. cit. supra note 72, at 84 n.75.
75 Law No. 13,988, LEGISLAcION NACIONAL ARGENTINA, V. II, p. 195 (1950)
(hereafter cited as JUDICIARY ACT).
76 JUDICIARY AcT § 24, cl. 1.
7- The inclusion of suits between citizens and foreign states does not seem
to be warranted by the constitution. The Judiciary Act was enacted under the
Peronist constitution.
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MFXICO
In the Mexican constitution, two articles are devoted to
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The first one, besides providing the court with power to ad-
judicate controversies "between the powers of government of
any state as to the constitutionality of their acts," invests it
with jurisdiction "in all controversies arising between two
or more states,... between one or more states and the fed-
eral government, and in all cases to which the federal gov-
ernment may be a party." 78 The second places within the
jurisdiction of the court controversies involving "all ques-
tions of jurisdiction between the federal courts, between these
and those of the states, or between those of one state and
those of another." 79
By virtue of the provisions of the Judiciary Act,80 in
deciding the first group of cases the Supreme Court sits
en bane. Statutory provisions seem to be worded in some-
what broader terms than the constitutional ones. They in-
clude, in particular:
1. Controversies between two or more "federated en-
tities," or between the authorities of the same entity as to
the constitutionality of their acts.
2. Controversies which arise out of laws or acts of
federal authorities which infringe upon or restrain the sov-
ereignty of the states, or out of laws or acts of the states
which invade the scope of the federal power.
3. Controversies between a 'federated entity" and the
Federation.
4. Controversies to which the Federation is a party.
5. Controversies between federal or state courts and
military tribunals; between federal and state courts; and
between courts of two or more states.
78 MEX. CONST. art. 105.79 MEX. CONsT. art. 106.
S0 JUDICIARY ACT § 11 (1935) (amended by DIARI OFICIAL [Jan. 10, 1936],
as amended, DIARIO OFICIAL [Feb. 19, 1951]).
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6. Controversies submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court by labor legislation.
7. Cases involving the application of sanctions against
authorities disregarding judicial proceedings determining
that their acts were not warranted by law."'
8. Questions involving disqualification of judges in mat-
ters over which the court en banc has jurisdiction.
9. Similar questions involving the President of the
court.
10. Controversies between the chambers of the court.
Other matters within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, if not submitted to the jurisdiction of its chambers
by an express provision of the law, are also to be decided by
the court sitting en banc.
Besides, detailed statutory provisions submit to the
court, sitting as a body, different administrative and disci-
plinary matters."2
The chambers of the Supreme Court also decide some
controversies as courts of first instance. Thus, the first cham-
ber (criminal) has original jurisdiction over some criminal
cases involving the issuance of the writ of amparo; over con-
flicts of jurisdiction between lower courts in criminal cases;
over some questions relating to extradition of fugitives from
justice by one state to another, or to a foreign country; and
over some others.8 3
Provisions regulating the original jurisdiction of the ad-
ministrative, civil, and labor chamber follow the same
pattern.
8L Section 1 (VII) of the Judiciary Act, which makes reference to article
107(XVI) of the constitution as amended. The relevant constitutional pro-
vision reads as follows: "If, after the granting of an amparo the guilty official
persists in the act or acts against which the petition for amparo was filed, or
seeks to evade compliance with the judgment of the federal authority, he shall
be forthwith removed from office and turned over to the respective district
judge."
82 JUDICIARY ACT § 12. It is composed of not less than 31 clauses.
83 JUDICIARY ACT § 24.
[ VOL. 33
NATIONAL SUPREME COURTS
BRAZIL
The Brazilian constitution enumerates eleven groups of
cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the Federal
Supreme Court.84  The most important of these groups in-
clude "litigation between foreign states and the Union, the
states, the federal district, or the municipalities; . . . con-
flicts of jurisdiction between ... federal tribunals, between
... federal... tribunals and those of the states, and between
... tribunals of different states ... ," and "cases and con-
flicts between the Union and the states or between these
latter." However, suits between the Union and individuals
are left, in the first instance, to the state or territorial
courtsYsr
Besides, the court has original jurisdiction over common
crimes committed by the President of the Republic, the mem-
bers of the court and the Attorney General. As to some high
officials, federal and state, and the chiefs of diplomatic mis-
sions of permanent character the court has jurisdiction "in
common crimes and in those of responsibility." Other in-
stances of the original jurisdiction of the court include
"extradition of criminals, requested by foreign states and
the homologation of foreign sentences," and specified cases
of habeas corpus and writs of security. 6
CANADA
Contrary to the situation in other federations, there are
no usual categories of the original jurisdiction of the Su-
84 BRAz. CoNsT. art. 101, I.
85 Article 201 of the constitution provides: "Law suits in which the Union
is the plaintiff shall be judged in the capital of the state or territory in which
the other party is domiciled. Actions against the Union may be judged in the
capital of the state or territory in which the plaintiff has his domicile; in the
capital of the state in which the deed or fact which gave origin to the claim
occurred or in which the object be situated; or again, in the federal district.
§ 1. Cases brought before other judges, if the Union shall figure therein
as witness or opponent, shall come under the jurisdiction of one of thejudges of the capital.
§ 2. The law may permit the action to be brought in another court, com-
mitting the judicial representation of the Union to the state public
ministry."
86 BRAZ. Co-sT. art. 101, I.
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preme Court in Canada. The court may be asked to deliver
advisory opinions, and in this way can be requested, for in-
stance, to settle a dispute between the provinces if the case
is not brought before the Exchequer Court. In regular judi-
cial proceedings, the court has no original and exclusive juris-
diction in any case. The judges of the court have concurrent
jurisdiction with the courts of the provinces to issue writs
of habeas corpus; and if the writ is refused by the judge,
or the prisoner is remanded, an appeal lies to the court."
Besides, by a curious provision of the Supreme Court Act,88
provincial legislation may provide for removal to the Su-
preme Court of cases involving the question of constitution-
ality of legislation, federal or provincial. There is no re-
quirement of jurisdictional amount. Here, the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court does not depend on federal but on
provincial law. Some provincial statutes to that effect were
enacted.
In some cases in which the supreme courts in other
federal states have original jurisdiction, the court which is
competent is the Exchequer Court of Canada.89
AUSTRALIA
In Australia, the High Court is the only federal court,
state courts being invested with "federal jurisdiction." The
question of the original jurisdiction of the High Court is
strictly connected with the general problem of federal juris-
diction in Australia, and originates from the same constitu-
tional provisions.
Taking advantage of the authority granted it by section
75 of the constitution, the Australian Parliament provided
for original and exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court in
a few cases, and made it concurrent with the state courts
in others. By virtue of the Australian Judiciary Act, 0 the
High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in cases arising under
8_ CAN. Rrv. STAT. c. 259, § 57 (1952).
S CAN. REv. STAT. c. 259, §62 (1952).
89 This is true, in particular, in controversies between the provinces.
9°Australian Judiciary Act § 38, 3 CO.MMONWEALTH AcTs 1905-50, at 2387
(hereafter cited as JUDICIARY ACT).
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treaties (however, no such case has ever arisen) ; "I in those
between states or persons suing or being sued on behalf of
the states; in those between the Commonwealth and the states
or persons suing or being sued on behalf of them; and in
those in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition is sought
against an officer of the Commonwealth or a federal court.92
The meaning of "suing or being sued on behalf of the
Commonwealth" was discussed by the High Court. In an
unreported case of 1925 the question which was to be decided
was whether a body corporate established under the War
Service Homes Act, under the name of War Service Homes
Commissioner, was a party "suing on behalf of the Common-
wealth." 93 Starke, J., answered this question in the affirma-
tive on the ground that plaintiff "was but an agency or
instrumentality of the Commonwealth." Relying on this
conclusion and invoking the practice in the United States,
the same judge held, in 1948,9 4 that the original jurisdiction
of the High Court extends to a case where one of the parties
is the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, managed by a
Governor appointed by the Commonwealth government, hav-
ing its monetary and banking policy subjected to political
and governmental direction, and being, in essence, "an agency
or instrumentality of the Commonwealth."
The High Court's jurisdiction over disputes between the
states has been exercised in only one case,95 involving the
boundary line between Southern Australia and Victoria
96
Besides, when a constitutional inter se question arises
in a litigation in a supreme court of a state, the case has to
91 NIcHoLAs, THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 374 (2d ed. 1952).
92 By virtue of § 75 of the constitution, the issuance of such writs, along
with some other categories of cases, lies within the original jurisdiction of the
High Court. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict.
c. 12, § 75 (Austl.). Thus, there is no possibility of Marbury v. Madison.
Sawer, Judicial Power under the Constitution in ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION 74, 84 n.47 (Else-Mitchell ed. 1952); Dixon, Marshall and the
Australian Constitution, 29 AusT. L.J. 420, 425 (1955). The Parliament has
the power to decide whether this jurisdiction should be made exclusive or
concurrent.
93 War Serv. Homes Comn'r v. Kirkpatrick, unreported, mentioned in Bank
of New South Wales v. Commonwealth and four other cases, 76 Commw. L.R.
i, 321 (Austl. 1948).
114 Id. at 322.
95 See NICHOLAS, op. cit. supra note 91, at 32.
9 12 Commw. L.R. 667 (Austl. 1911) ; 18 Commw. L.R. 115 (Austl. 1914).
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be removed to the High Court; thus, in those instances, the
jurisdiction of the court is original and exclusive of the su-
preme courts of the states. However, the same is not true
in respect to inferior state courts.
It must be observed that not in all cases in which the
High Court has original jurisdiction by virtue of section 75
of the constitution, was this jurisdiction made exclusive by
legislation. In the remaining cases, jurisdiction is concur-
rent with the courts of the states; such is the situation with
suits "affecting consuls or other representatives of other
countries"; those between individuals and the Commonwealth
or the states (with an exception) ; those in which injunction
is sought against a federal officer; and in diversity of resi-
dence cases.
Jurisdiction over cases brought against the Common-
wealth and the states would not mean much without a statu-
tory permission to bring such suits, in view of the common-
law doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from being
sued without its permission. By an express constitutional
provision, the Parliament was empowered to "make laws con-
ferring rights to proceed against the Commonwealth or a
State in respect of matters within the limits of the judicial
power." 97
On the authority of the constitutional permission, the
Parliament proceeded in the Judiciary Act to divest the
Commonwealth and the states of their immunity to be sued
in tort as well as in contract. Jurisdiction over suits brought
by individuals against the Commonwealth has been vested
concurrently in the High Court and the supreme courts of
the states in which the claims arose. Suits by individuals
against states, involving a point over which the High Court
has or may have original jurisdiction by virtue of constitu-
tional provisions, may be brought before the supreme courts
of the states, and-if the High Court has been vested with
original jurisdiction over the matter-in the High Court.98
As to the suability of the Commonwealth and the states
among themselves, no special legislation was necessary to
97 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12,
§ 78 (Austl.).
98 JUDICIARY ACT § 56.
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provide for it, in the light of the express provisions of section
75 of the constitution. 9 All that the Parliament did was to
vest original jurisdiction in those cases exclusively in the
High Court, as above mentioned.
It was asserted that the effect of sections 75 and 78 of
the constitution and the provisions of the Judiciary Act,
abolishing the immunity of the states from being sued with-
out their consent, made them non-sovereign bodies.'10 Even
if there were such a thing as sovereignty, this statement,
assuming it to be true, would be of not much importance.
However, in the light of what was said previously, the whole
concept of sovereignty is a fiction, and in any event it is
utterly inapplicable to members of the federal states.
By virtue of section 30 of the Judiciary Act, enacted
under the authority of section 76(I) of the constitution, the
High Court has original jurisdiction, concurrently with the
state courts, "in all matters arising under the Constitution
or involving its interpretation." 101 Naturally, a broad clause
of this kind must have given rise to doubts as to the scope
of its application, similar to those arising in the United
States under a like provision. At first, the construction of
the meaning of "involving" by the High Court was restric-
tive; it held, in a 1907 case,10 2 that the constitutional ques-
tion should appear upon the face of the pleadings of the
parties. However, recently it took a broader view of the
problem. The court held in 1952, that under section 74 of
the constitution, the possibility of deciding a case upon an
99 Australia v. New South Wales, 32 Commw. L.R. 200 (Austl. 1923). In
this case, the Commonwealth sued a state in tort, for damages occasioned by
a collision of ships. The defense was that the High Court had no jurisdiction
to ehtertain the action without the consent of the defendant state. The High
Court disagreed with this contention, holding (by four justices) that jurisdiction
has been conferred on it by § 75(111) of the constitution. According to the
fifth justice, jurisdiction has been conferred by § 58 of the Judiciary Act,
enacted under the authority of § 78 of the constitution.
100 NICHoLAs, THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 375 (2d ed. 1952).
101 JUDICIARY AcT § 30(a). By virtue of § 40(I) of the act, if the case is
pending before a state court it may be removed into the High Court by an order
of the latter.
102 Miller v. Haweis, [1907] 5 Commw. L.R. 89, 93: "A question of federal
jurisdiction may be raised upon the face of a plaintiff's claim . . . or may be
raised for the first time in the defence." Even under this restrictive view, the
High Court's understanding of the term "arising under" was broader than that
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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inter se question is sufficient to treat the case as a constitu-
tional one, even if the decision is based on other grounds.10 3
Similarly, acting on the authority of section 76 (111) of
the constitution, the Parliament invested the High Court with
jurisdiction over admiralty cases.10 4 Since the repeal of this
statutory provision in 1939, the state supreme courts and the
High Court are considered courts of admiralty by virtue of
the British Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890.
The Parliament did not ever invest the High Court with
original jurisdiction over cases "arising under any laws made
by the Parliament," as it was authorized to do under section
76 (11) of the constitution; however, it provided for original
jurisdiction of the court in a number of situations, the most
comprehensive of which is over "indictable offenses against
the laws of the Commonwealth," '15 and the others being spe-
cified in some statutes such as the Customs Act, the Post
and Telegraph Act, and the Bankruptcy Act.106
The last category of cases over which the Parliament
has a constitutional authority to vest jurisdiction in the High
Court is that "relating to the same subject-matter claimed
under the laws of different States." 107 This provision is
similar to but broader than the clause of article III, section 2
of the Constitution of the United States vesting in the fed-
eral judicial power jurisdiction over cases "between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States . . . ." The Parliament has not taken advantage of
the constitutional permission; the provision itself was never
construed and is considered as not readily understandable. 08
103 In Nelungaloo Proprietary Ltd. v. Commonwealth, [1951-52] 85 Commw.
L.R. 545. See particularly Dixon J., at 572.
104 JUDICIARY ACT § 30A, enacted in 1914.
1 0 5 JUDICIARY ACT §30(c).
106 Beasley, The E.ercise of "Judicial Power" in the Comnzonuealth of
Australia, 27 CAN. B. REv. 686, 688 (1949).
107 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12
§ 76(IV) (Austl.).
108 "The obscurity of the . . . provision is obvious. Beasley, supra note
106, at 688 n.8. "Precisely what this means is a matter of speculation-
apparently it was designed to enable the High Court to be invested with a
general jurisdiction in matters of private international law in relation to the
States of Australia." Wynes, The Judicial Power of the Commonwealth,
12 AusTL. L.J. 8, 9 (1938).
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As a whole, the system of the High Court's original juris-
diction in Australia presents: a curious body of rules, some
of which are understandable only in the light of the country's
position within the British Commonwealth, and some others
being workable only because of the small number of the
member states in the Australian federation, their vast,
scarcely populated areas, and slight development of inter-
state commerce. The selection of the subjects of the original
jurisdiction of the High Court by the legislature was sub-
jected to criticism, 0 9 although it is difficult to say what
changes in the existing system would be advisable.
SWITZERLAND
In Switzerland, original jurisdiction of the Federal Tri-
bunal extends to civil, criminal and "public law" cases.
In civil matters, the basic provisions are found in article
110 of the constitution which reads as follows:
The Federal Tribunal shall have civil cognizance of disputes:
(1) Between the Confederation and the cantons;
(2) Between the Confederation of the one part, and corporations or
private individuals of the other part, when the latter are plaintiffs
and the dispute reaches the degree of importance to be prescribed
by federal legislation;
(3) Between cantons;
(4) Between cantons of the one part, and corporations or private in-
dividuals of the other part, where either party so demands and
the dispute reaches the degree of importance to be prescribed by
federal legislation.
The Federal Tribunal shall further take cognizance of differences in
regard to loss of nationality and disputes between communes of dif-
ferent cantons concerning civic rights.
109 "A general review of the mode of definition of the subjects of original
jurisdiction, actual and possible, of the High Court, leads to the conclusion
that somewhat artificial criteria have been adopted and the practical effects of
the constitution provisions have not been as satisfactory as the framers might
have expected. . . ." Wynes, supra note 108, at 9-10.
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The Tribunal's jurisdiction in cases stated in article 110
is exclusive. It is not resorted to frequently; in 1950 there
were ten cases.11
In the Judiciary Act,"1 the legislature indicated the
categories of cases which it deemed important enough to come
within the ambit of subsections 2 and 4 of article 110. In a
few inst4nces, no jurisdictional amount is required. In
others, the value of the matter in controversy must amount
to at least 4,000 Swiss francs.
It appears, from both subsections, that neither the Con-
federation nor the cantons are immune to the suits brought
by individual persons against them. In any event, this im-
munity, well recognized at common law, does not obtain in
civil law countries. It is interesting to note that subsection 2
is limited to cases where the suit is against the Confedera-
tion; thus, if the Confederation is the plaintiff, the litigation
goes to cantonal courts.
For a long time, due to the fact that most "public" and
administrative law disputes escaped the jurisdiction of the
Federal Tribunal, there was a tendency, on the part of the
Tribunal, to treat as many suits against the Confederation
as possible as civil suits," 2 and so bring them within the
ambit of article 110 (2) of the constitution and the relevant
provisions of the Judiciary Act." 3 With the extension of
the Tribunal's jurisdiction over public and administrative
law matters this extensive interpretation of "civil matters"
became unnecessary.
In suits between the cantons and individuals, the juris-
diction of the Tribunal depends on the parties: the Tribunal
adjudicates the case in the first and last instance when one
11o HUGHES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND 121 (1954).
11 §§ 41(b), 42; 95 B.S.E.I. 167 (1943); 60 Recueil des Lois Fdrales 269
(1944).
112 FLEINFR & GIACOMETI, SCHWEIZERISCHES BUNDESSTAATRECHT 842 (1949).
113 Thus, in Geneva Streetcar Co. v. Canton of Geneva, B. Ger. 38 II 735,
737 (1912), the Tribunal classified a suit challenging the imposition of some
taxes on the plaintiff as a civil case. Said the Tribunal: "On that point,
the Federal Tribunal constantly recognized that in spite of the fact that a fran-
chise, and particularly a railroad franchise, is an act of public law rather than
a bilateral contract, this franchise can nevertheless create some private rights
of an economic nature; in particular, the Tribunal considered as a private
right the exemption from taxes set in the franchise."
[ VOL. 33
NATIONAL SUPREME COURTS
of the parties so demands. Otherwise, the cantonal courts
take cognizance of the case.
In Switzerland, as in many other federations, the high-
est federal court was invested with jurisdiction over civil
law disputes between the Confederation and the cantons, and
between the cantons among themselves. In the former con-
stitution of 1848, any dispute of this kind could reach the
Tribunal only by the intermediary of the federal executive.
If the Federal Council decided not to submit the dispute to
the Tribunal, and did not pass upon the controversy itself,
it went to the legislature.1 1 4 Thus, the federal executive was
the judge of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. This provision, con-
trary to the dignity and independence of the Tribunal, was
dropped from the constitution of 1874.11
The importance of the last clause of article 110 can be
understood only in the light of the peculiarities of the tradi-
tional Swiss system of residence. The first clause of article
43 of the constitution provides that "every citizen of the
canton is a Swiss citizen." Thus, as in the United States and
other federal states, there is a double citizenship. But his-
torically, the most important "citizenship" was that of the
commune in which the individual lived.
The third clause of article 43 reads as follows:
A Swiss who has settled anywhere shall enjoy at his place of domicile
all the rights of citizens of the canton, together with all the rights of
a burgess of the commune. Participation in the property of com-
monalties and corporations, and the right to vote in matters exclu-
sively connected therewith, are excluded from these rights, unless
cantonal legislation otherwise decides.
This constitutional provision grants political rights, but
no communal property rights, to those admitted into resi-
dence in a commune. Historically, in order to have cantonal
citizenship, it was necessary to be a "burgess," or citizen, of
a commune. The communes offered assistance to their poor
citizens, and possessed their own estates, forests and pastures
which were for the use and enjoyment of their citizens, but
114 SwIT. CoNsT. art. 101 (1848).
115 SOURIAc, L'fVOLUTION DE LA JURISDICTION F.DERALE EN suiss 244 (1909).
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closed to strangers. Particularly for the rural population of
Switzerland the citizenship in a commune was a very precious
thing. The poor communes of the country becoming over-
populated, some of their citizens emigrated and sought to be
admitted as "burgesses" by some richer ones. In hundreds
of cases, individuals -forfeited, by the loss of residence, their
communal citizenship (and, at the same time, the cantonal
citizenship) without being able to become citizens of any
other. Religious differences, felt for a very long time much
more strongly in Switzerland than in most other countries,
were an important factor in refusing to admit members of a
religious minority group into citizenship. 116 But even with-
out this factor, in many Swiss communes it was for years
practically impossible for newcomers to acquire full burgess
rights. The communes became ever more closed, and the
number of "stateless" persons was increasing.
It was clear that no cantonal measures could cope with
.this problem which became a .very important and difficult
one in the whole country. Beginning in. 1832, suggestions
were advanced to regulatethe fate of "stateless" persons.by
federal legislation, and the constitution of 1.848 conferred
jurisdiction over disputes relating to these questions on the
Federal Tribunal. 'By the very fact of the. transformation
of a loose federation into a federal state, the question of fed-
eral citizenship. was born and had to be regulated. Hence
article 43 and the last clause of article 110 of the present con-
stitution which however do not impose on the communes
the obligation to grant all property- rights to the new
settlers."17
By virtue of article .114 of .the constitution, the legisla-
ture was granted unrestricted -power -to place matters not
-mentioned in the basic law within- the jurisdiction of the Tri-
bunal,' either original-or appellate. .Advantage was taken of
this permission in "some..criminal and. civil- cases, and, by
statutory provisions, the Tribunal is the.court, of first and
116 RAPPARD, THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND 11-12 (1936).
11 Historical observations on communal citizenship are taken from SOURIAC,
supra note 115, at 186.
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last instance in some cases of bankruptcy and those involving
railroads.118
Article 111 of the constitution is curious in that it per-
mits the parties to a dispute to vest the Tribunal with juris-
diction; the text of the article is as follows:
The Federal Tribunal is bound to judge other cases when the parties
agree to appeal to it and the matter in dispute is of the degree of
importance to be prescribed by federal legislation.
Under the Judiciary Act,"19 the jurisdictional amount
has been set at 10,000 francs. In 1950, seven cases were
brought before the Tribunal on the authority of the above
provisions. 12 0
The Federal Tribunal's jurisdiction by agreement of the
parties was not an innovation of the present constitution. It
was first provided for in the constitution of 1848,121 which
contained a further provision requiring the parties to cover
all the costs of the proceedings in the Tribunal occasioned
by their litigation.
Under the present scheme, the.Tribunal has concurrent
jurisdiction with the cantonal courts, at the election of the
parties, in all cases involving 10,000 francs or more.. Besides,
under the same section of the Judiciary Act, the Tribunal is
competent to decide in the first and last instance cases con-
ferred upon it by cantonal constitutions or statutes, provided
that the assent of the federal legislature is given. This
scheme is similar to the Canadian one.
In criminal law, the original jurisdiction of the Tribunal
is exercised by three of its five penal law departments.
One of these departments is called the "Criminal
Chamber," and sitting with twelve jurors, constitutes the fed-
eral jury court, 22 called into being. by mandate of article 112
218 FLEINER & G;AcomEwrI, SCHWEIZERISCHES 13UNDESSTAATRECHT 834 n.8
(1949).
119 JUDICIARY AcT § 41(c).
120 HUGHEs, TE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND 121 (1954).
121 SWIT. COTsT. art. 102 (1848).
12 2 JUDICIARY AcT § 12(1) (e) and § 1 of the code of criminal, procedure as
modified by JUDICIARY ACT § 168.
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of the constitution, which vests in the Tribunal, "with the
assistance of a jury to decide the facts," jurisdiction over
cases involving treason, major political offenses, and a few
others. 2 3  Constitutional provisions are supplemented by
those of the criminal code.'2 4
Cases coming under article 112 of the constitution are
very rare; the last one occurred in 1933.125
Another criminal chamber of the Tribunal, called the
Federal Criminal Court, 2 6 passes on cases not requiring a
jury, in instances provided for by law, by permission of
article 114 of. the constitution, such as counterfeiting. 2 7
The number of cases decided by this department is small-
three or four a year. 2 8
The last department, called the Chamber of Accusa-
tions, 2 9 acts like a grand jury for the previous ones, and in
cases coming under the original jurisdiction of cantonal au-
thorities, decides in which canton they should be tried in
case of doubt. 3 0 Out of about sixty cases which constitute
the yearly business of this Chamber, about ninety per cent
are of the latter kind.' 3 '
By virtue of a peculiar provision of the federal code of
criminal procedure, the Federal Council has the power to
transfer, in particular instances, the jurisdiction over crimes
which by statute are within the original jurisdiction of the
123 Article 112 enumerates:
(1) Cases of high treason against the Confederation, and revolt and vio-
lence against the federal authorities;
(2) Crimes and offenses against international law;
(3) Crimes and political offenses which are the cause or consequence of
disorders necessitating armed federal intervention;
(4) Charges against official appointed by a federal authority, when brought
before the tribunal by that authority.
124 Criminal code, § 265 (high treason, overthrow of the government or
amending the constitution by force, etc.), § 299 (disturbance of the territory
of a foreign state), § 300 (hostilities against foreign armed forces), § 341 (a
few other cases).
125 HUGHES; THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWIrLZnAND 122 (1954).
126 JUDIcIARY AcT § 12(1) (f).
127 §§ 340, 342 of the criminal code.
128 HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 125, at 125.
129 JUDICIARY ACT § 12(1) (d).
130 Section 264 of the code of criminal procedures, as modified by § 168 of
the Judiciary Act.
131 HUGHES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND 125 (1954).
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Tribunal, to cantonal courts.1 3 2  In these cases, the cantonal
procedural law is to be applied. The whole scheme is of minor
importance.
One of the nine departments of the Federal Tribunal Jas
jurisdiction over public-constitutional and administrative-
law matters.
The constitutional basis of the public law jurisdiction
of the Tribunal is found in articles 113 and 114A of the
constitution, article 114 leaving the legislature free to invest
the Tribunal with jurisdiction over any other matter it sees
fit.
In article 113, clause 1, of the constitution, it is pro-
vided that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall extend to:
(1) Conflicts of competence between federal authorities on one side
and cantonal authorities on the other side;
(2) Disputes in public law between cantons. 133
In addition, in the third paragraph, the article includes
complaints alleging violation of the constitutional rights of
citizens.
The first provision of article 113 vests in the Tribunal
the duty to delimit the competence of the federal and can-
tonal authorities. 3 4  It affords protection against acts in ex-
cess of their power by any of the three branches of the
cantonal governments; but if the latter are plaintiffs, they
can be given remedy only against the federal executive, which
very rarely happens. 31' Private individuals are not permitted
to ask the Tribunal for a remedy, under the above provision.
Federal and cantonal authorities alone are proper parties to
the proceedings.
The next provision of article 113 adopts the rule usually
followed in federations that the supreme judicial organ of
the federation has original jurisdiction over the disputes be-
tween its members. However, the Swiss system has its
132 Section 18.
133 Translation taken from HUGHES, Op. cit. supra note 131, at 122.
1
3 4 The constitutional provision was supplemented by § 83 (a) of the judiciary
Act.
235 The Tribunal cannot review the acts of the federal legislature.
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peculiar features. A separate constitutional provision of
article 110 vested in the Tribunal jurisdiction over civil law
disputes between the cantons; article 113 refers to public
law disputes which, if considered as administrative by the
legislature, may be excluded from the competence of the
Tribunal.
The idea that litigation between the members of the fed-
eration should not be resolved by force is as old as the league
between three cantons which gave rise to the formation of
Switzerland, under which disputes between its members were
to be settled by pacific means.13 6 In the course of years, arbi-
tration between the members of the Confederation became the
established method of settling litigation. With a short inter-
ruption, such a state of affairs lasted until 1848.117
Under the system of the constitution of 1848, the general
rule was that civil law disputes between the cantons were
decided by the Tribunal, whereas public law disputes escaped
its jurisdiction.
Even today, arbitration between the cantons is recog-
nized by the constitution as one of the methods of settling
intercantonal disputes, and the Federal Council is directed
to execute arbitral awards. 8s Any recourse to force by the
cantons is forbidden. 13 9
When the dispute is not legal, but involves only a con-
flict of interests between the cantons, and a compromise is
not reached, the Federal Council takes care of the problem. 4 "
But even legal disputes can be, and some actually are, sub-
mitted to the Federal Council by legislation.. 4  Before the
136 The earliest treaty of alliance between the three original cantons, in 1291,
pr ovided for "friendly remonstrances" between "wise men" of the three, in an
attempt to settle controversies peaceably. Coolidge, The Swiss Federal Court,
4 L.Q. REv. 409, 415-16 (1888).
137 Schindler, Administration of Justice in the Swiss Federal Court in Inter-
cantonal Disputes, 15 Ame. J. INT'L L. 149 (1921). One of the last instances of
arbitration before the transformation of Switzerland into a federal state was
that between Schwyz and Uri in 1845, concerning the interpretation of a treaty
of 1350 between the two cantons. Id. at 151. See also Coolidge, supra note
136, at 416.
138 Swlr. CONST. art. 102(5).
139 SwiT. CoxsT. art. 14.
140 On the basis of articles 85(7) and (8) of the constitution. FLEINER &
GIACOME-rI, ScHwsazERiscHEs BUNDESSTAATRECHT 877 (1949).
141 FLEINER & GIACOMETTI, op. cit. supra note 140, at 877. Section 83(b) of
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Tribunal, the claim must be based on a rule of law; if plain-
tiff relies only upon considerations of equity or utility, the
Tribunal will dismiss the suit. The principle of article 2 of
the Swiss Civil Code, directing the judge, in cases of a gap
in the law, to decide the case "according to the rule which
he would establish if he were a legislator," is inapplicable
to intercantonal disputes.'42
The idea of an intercantonal dispute is rather broad; it
covers disputes between communes of different cantons,143
which may be nominal parties to the suit, or on behalf of
which a canton may sue, or be sued. Disputes as to cantonal
citizenship and questions of guardianship are expressly in-
cluded by the Judiciary Act.144  Unlike the situation in the
United States, cantons may also espouse claims of their
citizens, provided they have an incident interest in the
litigation.145
A type of intercantonal dispute which frequently reaches
the Tribunal is one involving double taxation, which is pro-
hibited by the constitution,' 46 and other conflicts of com-
petence, e.g., those involving questions of inheritance. 47
the Judiciary Act vests in the Federal Tribunal jurisdiction over "disputes in
public law between cantons when one cantonal government resorts to the Tri-
bunal, and the matter is not within the competence of the Federal Council by
virtue of special provisions of the Federal law."
142 Schindler, Administration of Justice in the Swiss Federal Court in Inter-
national Disputes, 15 Am. J. INT'L L. 149, 159 (1921).
143 This contingency is expressly provided for by article 110 of the consti-
tution; it is lacking, however, in article 43.
144 JUDICIARY ACT §§ 83(c), (d), (e).
145 Thus, in one of the earliest cases between the cantons the real parties in
controversy were private individuals who had commercial establishments on the
same stream. The litigation involved the use of the water from the stream,
and was rendered acute by the fact that the parties interested based their rights
on conflicting statutes of the Cantons of Aargau and Ziirich. B. Ger. 4, 34
(1878). In this approach, Swiss intercantonal law is following international
law and differs from the United States interstate law.
14 6 SwIw. CoNsT. art. 46, cl. 2: "Federal legislation will make the necessary
provisions . . . for preventing the double taxation of a citizen." There was
no similar provision in the constitution of 1848, but the Federal Assembly, acting
in a judicial character, prohibited double taxation anyhow. Schindler, op. cit.
supra note 142, at 156.
147 FLEINER & GIACoMETrM, SCHWEIZFRISCHES BUNDESSTAATRECHT 877 (1949).
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Boundary disputes are next, social assistance cases forming
the third important group. 4 '
The year 1928 marked an important change in the de-
velopment of the Federal Tribunal. On the ground of the
constitutional amendment calling for the establishment of.a
federal administrative court, the Tribunal was vested with
administrative law jurisdiction for the first time, and the
powers of the two other branches of government in these mat-
ters were limited. The administrative law chamber of the
public law department of the Federal Tribunal, besides its
appellate jurisdiction, exercises original jurisdiction in a few
cases provided for by the Judiciary Act, 14 9 particularly where
the pecuniary responsibility of the Confederation is involved,
as in cases of accidents happening during military exercises,
of claims of federal employees in connection with their ser-
vice, etc. Other cases may be provided for by legislation. 50
Besides, "the cantons have the right to give the federal
administrative court jurisdiction in administrative disputes
regarding cantonal affairs," if the federal legislature gives its
assent. 15' In such cases, the Federal Tribunal's character is
that of a cantonal court.
148 For more details on intercantonal disputes, see Huber, The Intercantonal
Law of Switzerland (Swiss Interstate Law), 3 Am. J. INT'L L. 62 (1909);
Schindler, Administration of Justice in The Swiss Federal Court in Inter-
national Disputes, 15 Ai. J. INTL' L. 149 (1921).
49 JUDICIARY ACT §§ 110, 111.
150 JUDICIARY Acr § 111(i).
151 Swir. CoNsT. -art. 114A, cl. 41, supplemented by JuDicrARY Acr § 116.
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